



NEWSLETTER 2017-23

CALENDAR:

Departmental Seminar

Nick Zubanov (University of Konstanz)

Market competition and the effectiveness of incentive pay

Monday, November 6

16:30–18:00

VG H26

IOS Seminar

Elena Shulzhenko (Copenhagen Business School)

Working under the sword of Damocles: variable share of pay in Russian enterprises

Tuesday, November 7

13:30–15:00

WiOS 109 (Landshuter Str. 4)

Economic and Social History Seminar

Roman Smolorz (University of Regensburg)

Deportationen aus dem Ghetto Litzmannstadt nach Auschwitz-Birkenau im August 1944: Sozialprofil der Täter vor und nach 1945

Wednesday, November 8

18:00–20:15

VG 1.30

ABSTRACTS:**Departmental Seminar**

Nick Zubanov

Market competition and the effectiveness of incentive pay

(joint work with Pooyan Khashabi, Matthias Heinz, Tobias Kretschmer and Guido Friebel)

Abstract: The effectiveness of incentive pay is known to depend on several employee- and firm-specific factors. Yet, the role of factors outside the firm is less known. We study the effect of one such factor – market competition – on the effectiveness of a given incentive scheme. Our theory predicts that incentives are most effective when competition is moderate: too low competition reduces incentives because there is little extra market to gain, whereas too high competition increases the likelihood of competitor response. We test this prediction with a field experiment in which a standard incentive scheme was implemented in a retail network whose 193 shops operated under varying intensity of local competition. The results confirm our theory, and are robust to alternative explanations.

IOS Seminar

Elena Shulzhenko

Working under the sword of Damocles: variable share of pay in Russian enterprises

Abstract: The Russian industrial workplace is characterised by persistent problems with workers' discipline, low trust between workers and management and high cynicism. Such attitudes seem to be more pronounced at local companies than at subsidiaries of MNCs. The study compares remuneration systems at two local enterprises and a subsidiary of a foreign MNC and questions how these systems affect workplace attitudes. Building on the theory of enterprises' social orders by Krzywdzinski (2017), it argues that remuneration systems in Russian manufacturing enterprises are characterised by three contradictions. Firstly, there is a tradition of narrowly defined job-based pay in Russia but criteria for a variable share of pay are weakly formalised. Secondly, while many local companies keep some leftovers of the soviet solidarity rhetoric in employees' recognition practices, they are unwilling to support this rhetoric with tangible monetary incentives. Thirdly, although workers formally have a right for organized interest representation, employers are able to unilaterally alter remuneration rules and managers show high arbitrariness in using sanctions on the shop floor. The degree of workers' compliance and commitment in the workplace depends on the companies' ability to resolve these contradictions.

Economic and Social History Seminar

Roman Smolorz

Deportationen aus dem Ghetto Litzmannstadt nach Auschwitz-Birkenau im August 1944: Sozialprofil der Täter vor und nach 1945

Abstract: Neu recherchierte Quellen belegen den Einsatz einer „Regensburger Wachkompanie“ der Reserve-Polizei bei den Transporten von Juden aus dem im Sommer 1944 aufgelösten Ghetto Litzmannstadt in das Vernichtungslager Auschwitz-Birkenau. Die deutsche Polizei war im „Dritten Reich“ eine Reichsbehörde, und der Befehlshaber der Wachkompanie amtierte innerhalb des Wehrkreises XIII in Nürnberg. Wie wirkt sich die Struktur der Polizei im Nationalsozialismus auf die Recherchen aus? Im Vortrag wird über die ersten Ergebnisse der bereits vorliegenden Quellen berichtet und ferner erörtert, mit welchen Fragestellungen sie vertieft werden könnten. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt den personellen Kontinuitäten bei der Polizei nach 1945.

SAVE THE DATE:

7th roots lecture in economics on November 16, 2017:

Dr. Klaus Regling, Managing Director of the European Stability Mechanism (esm), will talk about "Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip in der europäischen Makropolitik". Details and registration: <https://roots-ev.de/>

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Wednesday, November 8 – 11 pm

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