

Belief functions over Belnap–Dunn logic

Sabine FRITTELLA

INSA Centre Val de Loire, Bourges
Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale d'Orléans (LIFO)
`sabine.frittella@insa-cvl.fr`

Joint work with

Marta Bílková, D. Kozhemiachenko, Ondrej Majer and Sajad
Nazari

[Preprint arXiv:2203.01060](https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.01060)

- 1 Representing incomplete/contradictory probabilistic information
 - Belnap–Dunn Logic
 - Non-standard probabilities


- 2 Dempster-Shafer theory
 - Mass functions, belief functions and plausibility functions
 - Representation of evidence

- 3 Dempster-Shafer theory and BD logic
 - Our proposal
 - Examples for mass functions, belief functions and combination of evidence
 - What about plausibility?


- 4 References

Belnap–Dunn square $(\mathbf{4}, \wedge, \vee, \neg)$ is a de Morgan algebra.

- $(\mathbf{4}, \wedge, \vee)$ is a lattice
- each element represents the available positive and/or negative information
 - n : no information
 - f : false (is bottom)
 - t : true (is top)
 - b : contradictory information
- \neg is an involutive de Morgan negation.



Belnap–Dunn square 4



Language. $L_{BD} \ni \varphi := p \in \text{Prop} \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \neg\varphi$

Models. $M = \langle W, v^+, v^- : W \times \text{Prop} \rightarrow \mathbf{2} \rangle$

$v^+(p)$: states where one has information supporting the truth of p

$v^-(p)$: states where one has information supporting the falsity of p

Semantics. Two satisfaction relations \models^+, \models^-

$$w \models^+ p \text{ iff } w \in v^+(p)$$

$$w \models^- p \text{ iff } w \in v^-(p)$$

$$w \models^+ \neg\phi \text{ iff } w \models^- \phi$$

$$w \models^- \neg\phi \text{ iff } w \models^+ \phi$$

$$w \models^+ \phi \wedge \phi' \text{ iff } w \models^+ \phi \text{ and } w \models^+ \phi' \quad w \models^- \phi \wedge \phi' \text{ iff } w \models^- \phi \text{ or } w \models^- \phi'$$

$$w \models^+ \phi \vee \phi' \text{ iff } w \models^+ \phi \text{ or } w \models^+ \phi' \quad w \models^- \phi \vee \phi' \text{ iff } w \models^- \phi \text{ and } w \models^- \phi'$$

- Independence of the probability assigned to positive and negative information
- Extend BD model with a classical probability measure.

A **probabilistic BD model** is a tuple $M = \langle W, v^+, v^-, m \rangle$, s.t.

- $\langle W, v^+, v^- \rangle$ is a BD model and
- $m : W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is a mass function on W i.e. $\sum_{s \in W} m(s) = 1$

Positive probability of φ : $p^+(\varphi) := \sum \{ m(s) \mid s \Vdash^+ \varphi \}$.

Negative probability of φ : $p^-(\varphi) := \sum \{ m(s) \mid s \Vdash^- \varphi \}$.

Remark. $p^+(\varphi)$ and $p^-(\varphi)$ are independent.

[Klein et al] Lemma 1

Let $M = \langle W, v, m \rangle$ be a probabilistic BD frame. Then the non-standard probability function p^+ induced by m satisfies:


- (A1) normalization $0 \leq p^+(\varphi) \leq 1$
- (A2) monotonicity if $\varphi \vdash_{BD} \psi$ then $p^+(\varphi) \leq p^+(\psi)$
- (A3) import-export $p^+(\varphi \wedge \psi) + p^+(\varphi \vee \psi) = p^+(\varphi) + p^+(\psi)$.

Remarks

- $p^-(\varphi) = p^+(\neg\varphi)$
- Weaker than classical Kolmogorovian axioms.
Additivity does not hold and is replaced by A3.
- In general $p^+(\neg\varphi) \neq 1 - p^+(\varphi)$
- one can have $0 < p^+(\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi)$

Continuous extension of Belnap–Dunn square, which we can see as the product bilattice $\mathbf{L}_{[0,1]} \odot \mathbf{L}_{[0,1]}$ with $\mathbf{L}_{[0,1]} = ([0, 1], \min, \max)$.

- $(p^+(\varphi), p^-(\varphi))$: positive and negative probabilistic support of φ .
- $(0, 0)$: no information concerning φ is available
- $(1, 1)$: maximally conflicting information
- vertical dashed line: “classical” case



- 1 Representing incomplete/contradictory probabilistic information
 - Belnap–Dunn Logic
 - Non-standard probabilities

- 2 Dempster-Shafer theory
 - Mass functions, belief functions and plausibility functions
 - Representation of evidence

- 3 Dempster-Shafer theory and BD logic
 - Our proposal
 - Examples for mass functions, belief functions and combination of evidence
 - What about plausibility?

- 4 References

Belief functions and plausibility functions

Let $f : \mathcal{P}(S) \rightarrow [0, 1]$ be a monotone function such that $f(\emptyset) = 0$ and $f(S) = 1$.

- f is a belief function if, for every $k \geq 1$, and for every $A_1, \dots, A_k \in \mathcal{P}(S)$, it holds that

$$f\left(\bigvee_{1 \leq i \leq k} A_i\right) \geq \sum_{\substack{J \subseteq \{1, \dots, k\} \\ J \neq \emptyset}} (-1)^{|J|+1} \cdot f\left(\bigwedge_{j \in J} A_j\right). \quad (1)$$

- f is a plausibility function if, for every $k \geq 1$, and for every $A_1, \dots, A_k \in \mathcal{P}(S)$, it holds that

$$f\left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq k} A_i\right) \leq \sum_{\substack{J \subseteq \{1, \dots, k\} \\ J \neq \emptyset}} (-1)^{|J|+1} \cdot f\left(\bigvee_{j \in J} A_j\right). \quad (2)$$

Mass function

Let $\text{bel}, \text{pl} : \mathcal{P}(S) \rightarrow [0, 1]$ be a monotone function such that $f(\emptyset) = 0$ and $f(S) = 1$, and $m : \mathcal{P}(S) \rightarrow [0, 1]$.

Definition

m is a mass function if $\sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(S)} m(A) = 1$.

Theorem

- bel is a belief function iff there is a mass function $m_{\text{bel}} : \mathcal{P}(S) \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that, for every $A \in \mathcal{P}(S)$,

$$\text{bel}(A) = \sum_{B \leq A} m_{\text{bel}}(B)$$

- if bel is a belief function, then $\text{pl}(A) = 1 - \text{bel}(\neg A)$ is a plausibility function.
- if pl is a plausibility function, then $\text{bel}(A) = 1 - \text{pl}(\neg A)$ is a belief function.

Representation of evidence. Example

- $m : \mathcal{P}(S) \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is computed based on the evidence
- $\text{bel}(A) = \sum_{B \leq A} m(B)$: the evidence supporting a
- $\text{pl}(A) = 1 - \text{bel}(\neg A) = \sum_{B \cap A \neq \emptyset} m(B)$: the evidence not contradicting A
- $\text{bel}(A) \leq \text{pl}(A)$.

Example

Scenario. A patient has disease a , b or c .

A doctor says “the patient has disease a or b with certainty 0.7.”

The doctor gives no information about disease c .

Representation of evidence. An example


Scenario. A patient has disease a , b or c .

A doctor says “the patient has disease a or b with certainty 0.7.”

It is assumed it is impossible for the patient to have two of these diseases.

Representation

- $S = \{a, b, c\}$ and $m, \text{bel}, \text{pl} : \mathcal{P}(S) \rightarrow [0, 1]$
- $m(\{a, b\}) = 0.7$ and $m(S) = 0.3$.



An example

Scenario. A patient has disease a , b or c .

A doctor says “the patient has disease a or b with certainty 0.7.”

The doctor gives no information about disease c .

Representation

- $S = \{a, b, c\}$ and $m, \text{bel}, \text{pl} : \mathcal{P}(S) \rightarrow [0, 1]$
- $m(\{a, b\}) = 0.7$ and $m(S) = 0.3$.

We get:

$$\text{bel}(\{a\}) = \text{bel}(\{b\}) = \text{bel}(\{c\}) = 0$$

$$\text{bel}(\{a, b\}) = \sum_{X \subseteq \{a, b\}} m(X) = 0.7 \quad \text{pl}(\{a, b\}) = 1 - \text{bel}(\{c\}) = 1$$

$$\text{pl}(\{a\}) = \text{pl}(\{b\}) = 1$$

$$\text{pl}(\{c\}) = 1 - \text{bel}(\{a, b\}) = 0.3$$

- $m(\{a, b\})$: the ‘probability’ that the disease is in the set $\{a, b\}$ without being able to say to which subset it belongs.
- if m is non-zero only on singletons, then bel and pl are probability functions.

Dempster-Shafer combination rule

Let m_1 and m_2 be two mass functions on a powerset algebra $\mathcal{P}(S)$. Dempster-Shafer combination rule computes their aggregation $m_{1\oplus 2}$ as follows.

$$m_{1\oplus 2} : \mathcal{P}(S) \rightarrow [0, 1]$$
$$X \mapsto \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } X = \emptyset \\ \frac{\sum\{m_1(X_1) \cdot m_2(X_2) \mid X_1 \cap X_2 = X\}}{\sum\{m_1(X_1) \cdot m_2(X_2) \mid X_1 \cap X_2 \neq \emptyset\}} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Normalization factor:

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum\{m_1(X_1) \cdot m_2(X_2) \mid X_1 \cap X_2 \neq \emptyset\} \\ &= 1 - \sum\{m_1(X_1) \cdot m_2(X_2) \mid X_1 \cap X_2 = \emptyset\} \end{aligned}$$

What happens with contradictory evidence?

Scenario

A patient has disease a , b or c .

Doctor 1: “the patient has disease a with certainty 0.9 and disease b with certainty 0.1.”

Doctor 2: “the patient has disease c with certainty 0.9 and disease b with certainty 0.1.”

Representation

$S = \{a, b, c\}$

$m_1(\{a\}) = 0.9$ and $m_1(\{b\}) = 0.1$.

$m_2(\{c\}) = 0.9$ and $m_2(\{b\}) = 0.1$.

Dempster-Shafer combination rule gives

$$m_{1 \oplus 2}(\{b\}) = 1$$

because $\{a\} \cap \{b\} = \{a\} \cap \{c\} = \emptyset$.

- 1 Representing incomplete/contradictory probabilistic information
 - Belnap–Dunn Logic
 - Non-standard probabilities
- 2 Dempster-Shafer theory
 - Mass functions, belief functions and plausibility functions
 - Representation of evidence
- 3 Dempster-Shafer theory and BD logic
 - Our proposal
 - Examples for mass functions, belief functions and combination of evidence
 - What about plausibility?
- 4 References

Define belief and plausibility on BD-models

Let Prop be a finite set of variables.

$M = \langle W, v^+, v^-, \text{bel} \rangle$ with $\text{bel} : \mathcal{P}(W) \rightarrow [0, 1]$.

$$\text{bel}^+(\phi) := \text{bel}(|\phi|^+) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{bel}^-(\phi) := \text{bel}(|\phi|^-)$$

bel^+ : belief function on the associated Lindenbaum algebra \mathcal{L}_{BD} .

bel^- : belief function on $\mathcal{L}_{\text{BD}}^{\text{op}}$.

Remark. if \perp and \top are not in the language bel^+ (resp. pl^+) are general belief (resp. plausibility) functions.

Consequence. $0 \leq \sum_{a \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{BD}}} m_{\text{bel}^+}(a) \leq 1$

Combination of evidence

Let \mathcal{L} be a finite distributive lattice.

Without \perp and \top

$$m_{1\oplus 2} : \mathcal{L} \rightarrow [0, 1]$$
$$x \mapsto \sum \{m_1(x_1) \cdot m_2(x_2) \mid x_1 \wedge x_2 = x\}.$$

With \perp and \top

$$m_{1\oplus 2} : \mathcal{L} \rightarrow [0, 1]$$
$$x \mapsto \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x = \perp \\ \frac{\sum \{m_1(x_1) \cdot m_2(x_2) \mid x_1 \wedge x_2 = x\}}{\sum \{m_1(x_1) \cdot m_2(x_2) \mid x_1 \wedge x_2 \neq \perp\}} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Examples. The two doctors

Scenario. A patient has disease a , b or c .

Doctor 1: a with certainty 0.9 and b with certainty 0.1.

Doctor 2: c with certainty 0.9 and b with certainty 0.1.

Representation. $m_1, m_2 : \mathcal{DM}_3 \rightarrow [0, 1]$

$$m_1(x) = \begin{cases} 0.9 & \text{if } x = a \\ 0.1 & \text{if } x = b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad m_2(x) = \begin{cases} 0.9 & \text{if } x = c \\ 0.1 & \text{if } x = b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Dempster-Shafer combination rule gives

$$m_{1 \oplus 2}(x) = \begin{cases} 0.81 & \text{if } x = a \wedge c \\ 0.09 & \text{if } x = a \wedge b \text{ or } x = b \wedge c \\ 0.01 & \text{if } x = b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{bel}_{1 \oplus 2}(a) = \text{bel}_{1 \oplus 2}(c) = 0.9 \text{ and } \text{bel}_{1 \oplus 2}(b) = 0.19$$

Examples. The two doctors

Representation. $m_1, m_2 : \mathcal{DM}_3 \rightarrow [0, 1]$

$$m_1(x) = \begin{cases} 0.9 & \text{if } x = a \wedge \neg b \\ 0.1 & \text{if } x = \neg a \wedge b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad m_2(x) = \begin{cases} 0.9 & \text{if } x = \neg b \wedge c \\ 0.1 & \text{if } x = b \wedge \neg c \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Dempster-Shafer combination rule gives

$$m_{1 \oplus 2}(x) = \begin{cases} 0.81 & \text{if } x = a \wedge \neg b \wedge c \\ 0.09 & \text{if } x = a \wedge b \wedge \neg b \wedge \neg c \text{ or } x = \neg a \wedge b \wedge \neg b \wedge c \\ 0.01 & \text{if } x = \neg a \wedge b \wedge \neg c \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{bel}_{1 \oplus 2}(a) = \text{bel}_{1 \oplus 2}(c) = 0.9 \text{ and } \text{bel}_{1 \oplus 2}(b) = 0.19$$

Examples. The two doctors

Representation. $m_1, m_2 : \mathcal{DM}_3 \rightarrow [0, 1]$

$$m_1(x) = \begin{cases} 0.9 & \text{if } x = a \wedge \neg b \wedge \neg c \\ 0.1 & \text{if } x = \neg a \wedge b \wedge \neg c \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$m_2(x) = \begin{cases} 0.9 & \text{if } x = \neg a \wedge \neg b \wedge c \\ 0.1 & \text{if } x = \neg a \wedge b \wedge \neg c \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Dempster-Shafer combination rule gives

$$m_{1 \oplus 2}(x) = \begin{cases} 0.81 & \text{if } x = a \wedge \neg a \wedge \neg b \wedge c \wedge \neg c \\ 0.09 & \text{if } x = a \wedge \neg a \wedge b \wedge \neg b \wedge \neg c \\ & \text{or } x = \neg a \wedge b \wedge \neg b \wedge c \wedge \neg c \\ 0.01 & \text{if } x = \neg a \wedge b \wedge \neg c \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{bel}_{1 \oplus 2}(a) = \text{bel}_{1 \oplus 2}(c) = 0.9 \text{ and } \text{bel}_{1 \oplus 2}(b) = 0.19$$

What about plausibility?

- $1 - \text{bel}^+(\neg\phi)$ defines a plausibility function
- $1 - \text{bel}^+(\neg\phi)$ is the sum of the masses of the set of states that do not support the negation of ϕ .

Problem: a set of states can support both ϕ and $\neg\phi$ and a set of states can support neither.

- In general, we can have $1 - \text{bel}^+(\neg\phi) \leq \text{bel}^+(\phi)$
- We can define plausibility independently of belief and impose $\text{bel}^+(\phi) \leq \text{pl}^+(\phi)$

$M = \langle W, v^+, v^-, \text{bel}, \text{pl} \rangle$ with $\text{bel}, \text{pl} : \mathcal{P}(W) \rightarrow [0, 1]$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{bel}^+(\phi) &:= \text{bel}(|\phi|^+) & \text{and} & & \text{bel}^-(\phi) &:= \text{bel}(|\phi|^-) \\ \text{pl}^+(\phi) &:= \text{pl}(|\phi|^+) & \text{and} & & \text{pl}^-(\phi) &:= \text{pl}(|\phi|^-) \end{aligned}$$

- What kind of two-dimensional reading of belief/plausibility can we propose?
- How can we interpret it?

Non-standard probabilities

Models: $(W, v^+, v^-, m : W \rightarrow [0, 1])$

$$p^+(\phi) = \sum_{s \in |\phi|^+} m(s) \text{ and } p^-(\phi) = \sum_{s \in |\phi|^-} m(s)$$

Immediate generalisation for belief.

Non-standard probabilities

Models: $(W, v^+, v^-, \text{bel} : \mathcal{P}(W) \rightarrow [0, 1])$

$$\text{bel}^+(\phi) = \sum_{X \subseteq |\phi|^+} m(X) \text{ and } \text{bel}^-(\phi) = \sum_{X \subseteq |\phi|^-} m(X)$$

- $p^+(\phi), \text{bel}^+(\phi)$: the probability/belief that ϕ is true
- $p^-(\phi), \text{bel}^-(\phi)$: the probability/belief that ϕ is false
- bel^+ is monotone and in $[0, 1]$, it satisfies the axioms of belief functions instead of
import-export: $p^+(\varphi \wedge \psi) + p^+(\varphi \vee \psi) = p^+(\varphi) + p^+(\psi)$.

Two-dimensional interpretation (2/2)

Models: $(W, v^+, v^-, \text{bel}, \text{pl} : \mathcal{P}(W) \rightarrow [0, 1])$

- Notice that in BD logic $|\phi| = (1, 1)$ reads as: there is evidence that ϕ is true and evidence that ϕ is false.
- In the classical case, $\text{bel}(\phi) = 1 - \text{pl}(\neg\phi)$.
→ interpretation: $\text{pl}(\neg\phi)$ is the degree of evidence against $\text{bel}(\phi)$ → $(\text{bel}^+(\phi), \text{pl}^-(\phi))$
→ $\text{pl}^-(\phi)$ maximum evidence against ϕ we can consider
- Consider both belief $(\text{bel}^+(\phi), \text{bel}^-(\phi))$ and plausibility $(\text{pl}^+(\phi), \text{pl}^-(\phi))$ independently
- If we ask $\text{bel}(X) \leq \text{pl}(X)$, for $X \in \mathcal{P}(W)$, then bel and pl come from different mass functions.
→ one piece of evidence does not support belief and plausibility in the same manner.
→ the same piece of evidence gives rise to two mass functions
e.g., circumstantial evidence vs. direct evidence

Example.

$$s_0 : \quad s_1 : p \quad s_2 : \neg p \quad s_3 : p, \neg p$$

Assume that $\text{bel}(X) \leq \text{pl}(X)$ and $\text{bel}(|p \wedge \neg p|^+) = 1$.

Therefore, we have

$$\sum_{X \subseteq |p \wedge \neg p|^+} m_{\text{bel}}(X) = \sum_{X \subseteq \{s_3\}} m_{\text{bel}}(X) = m_{\text{bel}}(\emptyset) + m_{\text{bel}}(\{s_3\}) = 1.$$

$m_{\text{bel}}(\emptyset) = 0$, hence $m_{\text{bel}}(\{s_3\}) = 1$.

We get

$$\begin{aligned} 1 \leq \text{pl}(|p \wedge \neg p|^+) &= \sum_{X \notin |p \wedge \neg p|^-} m_{\text{pl}}(X) = \sum_{X \notin |p|^- \cup |p|^+} m_{\text{pl}}(X) \\ &= \sum_{X \notin \{s_1, s_2, s_3\}} m_{\text{pl}}(X) = m_{\text{pl}}(S) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, evidence that is strongly persuasive considering $p \wedge \neg p$ is inconclusive regarding the plausibility of either p or $\neg p$.

- [Dunn 76] Dunn, *Intuitive semantics for first-degree entailments and 'coupled trees'*. *Philosophical Studies* 29(3), 149–168, 1976
- [Belnap 19] Belnap, *How a computer should think*, *New Essays on Belnap–Dunn Logic*, 2019.
- [Halpern 17] J.Y. Halpern. *Reasoning about uncertainty*. The MIT Press, 2nd edition, 2017.
- [Klein et al] D. Klein, O. Majer, and S. Rafiee Rad. *Probabilities with gaps and gluts*. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 50(5):1107–1141, October 2021
- [Shafer 76] G. Shafer. *A mathematical theory of evidence*. Princeton university press, 1976.
- [Zhou 13] C. Zhou. *Belief functions on distributive lattices*. *Artificial Intelligence*, 201:1–31, 2013.